Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Objects of thought, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. When several speakers refer on their inner object there is the problem of whether it is the same or not. For example, do they have the same wish?
See also relation-theory, truthmakers, mentalism, reification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Franz Brentano on Objects of Thought - Dictionary of Arguments
Prior I 121 Objects of thought/Brentano/Meinong/Findlay: Brentano: is a modern echo of Reid: Prior I 121/122 Brentano: Scholasticism called the intentional existence of an object a "direction (pointing) to an object" (this does not have to be something real) or "an immanent objectivity". Mental state/Brentano: everyone has in himself something that serves as an object, even if not all do this in the same way. Brentano's modern echo is Findlay. Intentional objects/thought objects/Findlay: (like Meinong): we can think of objects that do not exist. We can even make many true claims about them. Meinong: e.g. that the golden mountain does not exist is true but it is undoubtedly that it is both a mountain and a golden one. ((s) VsMeinong: E.g. just as an impossible thing is both: 1. impossible, 2. a thing.) Findlay/Meinong: existence or non-existence does not make any difference in reference to "being what". Non-existence/Meinong: "incomplete objects" that lie before us, whenever we think of them, in the general way "something that is so and so" (Similar to Reid:> triangle). Prior I 123 Intentionality/Brentano: unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation. >Intentionality, >Non-existence, >Objectivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Brentano
> Counter arguments in relation to Objects of Thought
